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Abstract 
This Working Paper presents an evaluation of the economic and environmen-
tal consequences of European harmonization proposals, drawn up by the
Commission in 1996 and early 1997, and regarding the taxation of energy prod-
ucts. The Paper is a revised version of a study carried out for the Services of the
European Commission in 1997. 
In the study, two types of measures are considered. The first type defines minimal
excise rates on energy products, as well as their evolution. Member countries are
supposed to apply the maximum between the effective (existing) rate and the
minimal (proposed) rate. The rise in tax rates are applied progressively over five
years. Generally, these measures should not lead to substantial increases in exist-
ing tax rates. Also, Member states are left free to apply rates higher than those
proposed by the Commission. If actual rates are higher than those proposed, they
must not be revised downwards, so as to avoid downward fiscal competition be-
tween Member states. 
Within the first type of measures, two cases are defined. In the first case, certain
member states receive a two year derogation regarding the increased minimum
excise rates. In the second case, one assumes that industrial sectors are taxed at a
level 20 % lower than in the first case. These two cases are evaluated both with
and without accompanying fiscal reform measures in favour of employment. 
In the second type of measures (or third case), Member states increase their effec-
tive tax rates up to the same growth rate of the new EC minimum levels. In this
more technical scenario, we have much higher increases in excise rates than in the
first group of cases. Once more, this case is evaluated both with and without ac-
companying fiscal reform measures in favour of employment. 
Finally, we evaluate the effects of the Commission’s February 1997 energy tax
proposal. The differences introduced in this proposal, as compared to case one of
the first type of measures, can be summarized as follows : 
Excise tax rates on motor fuels have been lowered ; 
Exemptions for energy intensive industries are implemented as provided
in article 15, paragraph 2 of the Commission’s Revised Proposal. 
In each of the above cases, the tax proceeds may be recycled into either reductions
in budget deficits, leading to reductions in interest rates, or reductions in employ-
ers’ social security contributions. Working Paper 8-98
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In general, the more realistic cases (cases one and two, as well as the February
1997 proposal), when tested with accompanying fiscal reform measures, have
positive effects on GDP, while leading to only slight increases in inflation. These
measures have positive effects on employment, and allow for reductions in CO2
emissions. Finally, notwithstanding the ex ante fiscal neutrality of the measures,
the scenarios lead to slightly positive effects on public finances. 
“An Evaluation of Fiscal Measures for Energy Products in the European Union. Results
from the HERMES-Link System”, F. Bossier, L. Lemiale, S. Mertens, E. Meyermans,
P. Van Brusselen, P. Zagamé. Working Paper 8-98, October 1998. Working Paper 8-98
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I Introduction 
This study concerns the evaluation of the economic and environmental conse-
quences of new harmonization proposals, at the European level, for the taxation
of energy products. The research was undertaken in 1996 and early 1997, in the
framework of a contract with the European Commission 1. 
Two types of measures are considered. With the first type of measures, one de-
fines minimal excise rates on energy products, as well as an evolution for these
rates. Member countries are supposed to apply the maximum between the effec-
tive existing rate and the minimal proposed rate. This rule implies that the
additional taxation differs among countries, depending on the initial level of tax-
ation, per product and per sector. 
Two intermediate cases are defined within the first type of measures. In the first
case, a limited number of Member states receive a two year derogation regarding
the increased minimum excise rates. The second case assumes that industrial sec-
tors are taxed at a level 20 % lower than in the first case. 
In the second type of measures, the member states increase their effective rates up
to the same growth rate of the new EC minimum levels. 
The new revised energy tax proposal involves consideration of issues regarding
CO2 emissions reductions and energy efficiency improvements. The results of the
different cases, which are presented in Chapter III, were obtained by simulating
the HERMES-Link system of models for six countries of the European Union : Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 2. 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter II presents in detail the different sce-
narios of energy taxation which are proposed by the Commission and comments
on the possible uses of the extra revenues (recycling options). 
Chapter III presents the main results. A first part describes the ex ante conse-
quences of the scenarios on energy prices and the importance of extra tax revenue
(in percent of GDP). We also comment the ex ante reduction in social security con-
tribution rates implied by the recycling option in favour of labour on one hand,
and the interest rate reduction implied by the recycling option in favour of capital
1. European Commission Contract n° 501-CT95-0008, “Climate Technology Strategy Within Com-
petitive Energy Markets”. Research funded in part by the European Commission in the frame-
work of the Non Nuclear Energy Programme JOULE III. 
2. For a description of the HERMES-Link system, see below. Working Paper 8-98
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on the other hand. The second part presents the main macroeconomic and secto-
ral results of the scenarios, as well as the results regarding energy. 
Finally, Chapter IV presents the simulation results for the Commission’s Revised
February 1997 Proposal for the taxation of energy products, which now has the
status of a Proposed European Directive. 
THE EUROPEAN HERMES MODEL 
The HERMES (Harmonized European Research for Macrosectoral and Energy Systems) project is a macroeconomic
modelling project which originated at and was co-financed by the European Commission (DG XII). The purpose of
the project was to construct an instrument for economic analysis of the Economies of the Member States of the Eu-
ropean Community. To this end, a standardized version of the HERMES model was designed and implemented in six
Member States (simplified models were developed for the other countries). 
General characteristics : macrosectoral econometric model, dynamic, annual, short-middle term (2 to 8 years). Pro-
duction function with 3 to 4 factors (of which energy), with the possibility of ex ante technical choice (putty-clay).
Energy divided in 8 forms : coal, coke, crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, derived gas, electricity, other en-
ergies of which nuclear heat. Similar models for 19 countries or zones linked by a bilateral trade flow model (of
which 12 EU countries, United States, Japan). Desegregation in nine branches : agriculture, energy, intermediate
goods, equipment goods, consumption goods, building and construction, transports and communication, other
market services, non market services. Fifteen consumption categories for the households. 
Quantitative characteristics : between 1500 and 2000 variables per country, of which 300 to 400 exogenous varia-
bles. 1500 equations of which 250 behavioural equations. Linkage module of 6000 equations.
Computer system : TROLL software for the management of data banks, econometric estimations and simulations.
For the Belgian Planning Office, integrated software IODE. 
Uses : medium term economic forecasts. Impact analysis of macroeconomic and sectoral policies, of multinational
policies, of energy policies...
Model inputs : exogenous variables concerning the international environment and in particular import prices of en-
ergy products, monetary policy variables, (interest rates and exchange rates), fiscal and budgetary policy variables,
demographic variables...
Model outputs : Input-Output tables in nine branches, in the ESA nomenclature, production factors demand (labour,
capital), detailed accounts for each institutional sector (firms, public administrations, households, rest of the world),
household consumption divided in 15 functions, integrated energy balance for 8 energy products, CO2 emissions. 
Main applications : 
Economic prospects for Europe : 1990-1994 (June 1990). 
Consequences of the Gulf crisis (September 1990). 
Technical and economic policy variants for the main EEC countries (September 1990). 
Bureau du Plan - Érasme, Un redéploiement fiscal au service de l’emploi. Réduction du coût salarial financée par la taxe
CO2 / énergie, Rapport à la DG XI de la Commission Européenne, novembre 1993. 
Bureau fédéral du Plan, Structure des prélèvements obligatoires et emploi. Aspects macroéconomiques des liens et des
possibilités d’intervention, Rapport à la DG XXI de la Commission Européenne, avril 1994. Working Paper 8-98
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II Definition of the Policy Cases 
A.The EC Harmonisation Proposal for Excise Taxes on Energy 
Products 
The new proposal, as set by the DG-XI in September 1996, implies a rise of the
minimum excise tax rates and a restructuring of taxation. Only excise taxes on
end-use energy consumption by transportation, residential, commercial and
industrial sectors will be affected ; the taxes on energy consumption for power
generation will remain unchanged. 
TABLE 1 - Proposal for minimum excise taxes (ECUS per specific unit) 
Unit 1996  a
a. Existing values 
1998 2000 2002 
Motor Fuels 
Gasoline klt 337 450 500 557
Gasoil klt 245 343 393 450
Kerosene klt 245 343 393 450
LPG tn 100 174 224 281
Natural Gas m3 100 174 224 281
Commercial and residential uses 
Gasoline klt 18 32 36 40
Kerosene klt 18 32 36 40
LPG tn 36 42 47 52
Natural Gas m3 -.- 10 23 39
Heating fuels - industry 
Heating gas oil klt 18 21 23 25
Heavy fuel oil tn 13 18 23 27
Kerosene klt -.- 8 16 25
LPG tn -.- 10 21 32
Natural Gas m3 -.- 8 16 24
Petroleum Coke  tn -.- 7 14 21
Hard coal tn -.- 5 11 17
Low grade anthracite tn -.- 4 8 12
Sub-bitumus coal tn -.- 3 9 9
Coke tn -.- 5 11 17
Opencast lignite tn -.- 2 4 5
Lignite briquettes tn -.- 4 9 14
Deep mined lignite tn -.- 3 7 11
Peat tn -.- 2 4 6
Electricity MWh -.- 1 2 3Working Paper 8-98
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Table 1 shows the existing and proposed levels of minimum excise taxes
(defined in Ecus per specific unit) for each product and each use. The implemen-
tation of these tax rates would start as of 1998. The rates should rise twice, in
2000 and in 2002. After 2002, they should keep up with the inflation rate up to
2005 which is the horizon of our study. The first column of the table shows the
minimum excise taxes as prevailing in 1996. 
Several energy carriers which are currently not taxed will be taxed as of 1998.
This will be the case for solid and gas fuels consumed by industry and for natu-
ral gas consumed by residential and commercial sectors. Electricity will be taxed
at end-use level. Moreover, the growth rate of excise taxes on diesel will be
higher than the one on gasoil. 
B.Recycling of Additional Revenue from the New Taxation 
Scheme 
The proposed modifications to the tax structure may have major economic con-
sequences. At the sectoral level, household consumption and industry’s optimal
mix of inputs will be reallocated in response to the changes in relative prices. At
the macroeconomic level, public finances, total employment and aggregate con-
sumption and investment will adjust to a new equilibrium. However, the exact
outcome of the higher energy taxes will to a large extent be determined by the
way in which the additional tax revenue is recycled. 
When new taxes are implemented, one has to address the question whether the
additional revenue from the new taxes should be recycled ? If the answer is yes,
what are the recycling options ? If not, what are the consequences for public
finances and interest rates ? 
In Europe, total labour costs are relatively high, partly due to high employers’
social security contributions (ESSC) rates. Therefore, it may prove worthwhile to
investigate the consequences of a reduction of these ESSC rates, financed by the
additional tax revenue accruing from the rise in excise taxes on energy. There are
strong  a priori reasons to suspect that such a measure would increase total
employment, while at the same time reducing CO2 emissions. Previous analyses
carried out with the HERMES models have shown that a “double dividend” can
be a realistic consequence from this type of fiscal reform. The DG-XI proposal fits
in this “win-win” policy framework. It recommends the recycling of the revenue
from the additional excises through a lowering of employers’ social security con-
tributions. The characteristics of a double dividend will be found in this sce-
nario. 
In the absence of redistribution, revenue from additional taxation will reduce the
public deficit, lowering interest rates and, consequently, increase investment and
consumption. To evaluate this link, we introduce in our simulations the same
assumption as in the exercise run with the GEM-E3 model by the NTUA1, which
concludes that the lowering of interest rates can induce a virtuous cycle of
1. National Technical University of Athens - Capros P., Georgakopoulos T. and Kokkolakis E., Eval-
uation of Fiscal Measures for Energy Products in European Union - Results from the GEM-E3 and 
MIDAS Models, Report to European Commission DG-XI.Working Paper 8-98
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growth, generated by investment. This report presents the results from six cases
run with the following European HERMES models in a simultaneous or linked
framework : Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. The six cases are a combination of three fiscal schemes and two reve-
nue recycling options. 
C.Definition of the Cases Studied 
Case-1 is based on the figures presented in table 1. In this first scenario, all EU
Member-States introduce rates defined as the maximum between either their
effective energy tax rates or the minimum values proposed by the EC. Current
tax rates of EU-countries are assumed to be updated with inflation and then com-
pared to the new minimum levels of taxation rates. This implementation rule
implies that the shift in the tax burden will differ between countries, as the addi-
tional taxation will depend on the preexisting levels of excise taxes. 
Case-1E allows to evaluate the potential negative effects of the taxation policy on
European industry by introducing excise rates for the industrial sectors which
are 20 % lower than in Case-1. 
Case-3 is an alternative scenario in which Member-States increase their effective
tax rates up to the same growth rates of the new EC minimum levels. For the
energy products that are not currently taxed, the same rates as in Case-1 are
adopted. 
In order to evaluate these tax policies, their effects have been compared under
the assumption of fiscal neutrality 1. We have adopted the same two revenue
recycling options as Capros et al. did 2, i.e. : 
In the Labour Fiscal Reform scenarios, recycling is introduced in the form
of lower indirect labour costs. The rate of employers’ social security con-
tributions has been lowered uniformly among all sectors. The reduction of
the rate of social security contributions has been calibrated ex ante in order
to compensate exactly the additional revenue from energy taxation. 
In the Interest Rate Cases, market interest rates are adjusted without any
explicit revenue recycling. As investments are directly influenced by the
adjustment of real interest rates, this scenario is characterized by a recy-
cling in favour of capital. 
1. Note that the NTUA study makes the assumption of budget neutrality. In our study, we only recy-
cle the ex ante receipts of the new taxation and do not try to obtain an ex post neutral effect on the 
public budget as a whole.
2. Ibidem., pages 14,15Working Paper 8-98
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For each of the three taxation cases (named 1,1E and 3 in the Commission’s pro-
posal), we consider two macro-economic recycling options, one in favour of
labour, through a lowering of labour costs, and one in favour of capital, through
an adjustment of interest rates. Table 2 gives an overview of the cases in this
study. As shown in this table, scenarios and cases have been renamed as Cases 1
or 1C, 2 or 2C and 3 or 3C. The DG-XI defined an additional sensitivity analysis,
Case-1D, assuming that Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece would benefit from
a derogation of two years. As those countries are not modelled in the HERMES-
Link system, we could not analyse this scenario. 
TABLE 2 - Cases Studied
Taxation Scenarios 
Revenue Recycling Options  Case-1 Case-1D Case-1E Case-3
Interest Rate Case  Case-1 -.- Case-2 Case-3
Labour Fiscal Reform  Case-1C -.- Case-2C Case-3CWorking Paper 8-98
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III Simulation Results 
A.The Ex Ante Results 
Table 3 summarizes the impact of the new taxes on energy prices. The changes in
the total energy price differ across countries because of differences in consump-
tion patterns and initial levels of taxation. For Case 1 the initial price increases
are modest, although some noticeable differences can be observed in 2005, when
prices in the United Kingdom and Belgium differ by more than 5 percent from
the baseline, reflecting low initial tax rates. For Case 3 the effects are more pro-
nounced, especially for Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom where in
2005 the total energy price differs by respectively 32, 31 and 20 percent from the
baseline, reflecting to a large extent strong increases in the energy price for trans-
portation and households. 
Higher taxes generate additional tax revenue, as shown in table 4. In Case 1 the
impact in 1998 is rather modest, with the highest additional revenue accruing to
Belgium and the United Kingdom, i.e. 0.26 and 0.18 percent of GDP respectively,
while in 2005 tax revenue increases to about 0.5 percent of GDP in Belgium and
the United Kingdom, and less than 0.3 in the other countries. In Case 3 the initial
tax revenue increase is more pronounced, and ranges between 0.59 percent of
GDPfor Germany and 1.27 percent of GDP for Italy, while in 2005 the additional
revenue adds up to 3.10 percent of GDP in Italy, but only 1.04 percent in Belgium. 
There are two macroeconomic scenarios to recycle the additional tax revenue. 
The first macroeconomic scenario makes no explicit assumption on the recycling
of the additional tax revenue. Only a real interest rate adjustment is imposed,
which has a direct impact on investment and can thus be seen as a revenue recy-
cling option in favour of capital. Table 5 shows these real interest rate adjust-
ments. Here the real interest rates have to decline more in Case 3 than in Case 1,
reflecting the larger amount of deficit reduction in Case 3. 
In the second scenario it is assumed that the additional tax revenue is recycled
through a reduction of the employers’ social security contributions, which
applies in all sectors independently of their relative labour cost or the pre-exist-
ing level of the rate. Table 6 and Figure 1 show the ex post reduction in the
implicit employers’ social security contributions rates as a percentage point dif-
ference from the baseline. In Case 1 the reduction amounts to about 1.7 percent
in Belgium and the United Kingdom and about 0.5 percent in Italy, the Nether-
lands, and France. In Case 3 there is a reduction of more than 10 percent in Italy,
compared to a more modest reduction in the other countries, where it varies
between 4 percent for Belgium and 8 percent for the Netherlands. Working Paper 8-98
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TABLE 3 - Energy prices (deviation w.r.t. baseline, in percent)
TABLE 4 - Revenue from the tax (as a percent of GDP)
1998 2000 2002 2005
Case 1 
Germany 0.64 2.16 3.71 3.84
Belgium 1.75 3.48 5.54 5.50
France 0.50 1.56 3.08 3.14
Italy 0.19 0.62 1.22 1.10
Netherlands 0.08 0.58 1.84 1.79
United Kingdom  1.67 3.67 5.52 5.34
Case 3 
Germany 7.22 13.24 19.33 19.88
Belgium 6.59 9.41 12.61 12.22
France 8.02 13.87 19.43 19.02
Italy 16.70 25.26 33.57 31.86
Netherlands 13.63 22.19 31.18 30.69
United Kingdom  11.08 15.94 20.63 20.28
1998 2000 2002 2005
Case 1
Germany 0.05 0.17 0.29 0.27
Belgium 0.26 0.41 0.56 0.53
France 0.04 0.12 0.22 0.19
Italy 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.09
Netherlands 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.15
United Kingdom  0.18 0.37 0.53 0.48
Case 3
Germany 0.59 0.99 1.35 1.24
Belgium 0.69 0.90 1.12 1.04
France 0.63 1.02 1.28 1.10
Italy 1.27 2.19 3.06 3.10
Netherlands 0.93 1.75 2.52 2.39
United Kingdom  1.13 1.31 1.80 2.02Working Paper 8-98
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TABLE 6 - Ex-post reduction in social security rates (deviation w.r.t. baseline, in percentage points)
TABLE 5 - Reduction of real interest rates (deviation w.r.t. baseline, in percentage points) a 
1998 2000 2002 2005
Case 1 
Germany -0.13 -0.23 -0.35 -0.30
Belgium -0.14 -0.26 -0.39 -0.34
France -0.21 -0.40 -0.57 -0.53
Italy -0.07 -0.14 -0.21 -0.18
Netherlands -0.12 -0.23 -0.35 -0.31
United Kingdom  -0.13 -0.21 -0.31 -0.27
Case 3 
Germany -0.96 -1.40 -1.76 -1.55
Belgium -1.01 -1.49 -1.87 -1.65
France -1.69 -2.42 -3.01 -2.60
Italy -0.54 -0.91 -1.07 -0.86
Netherlands -0.72 -1.32 -1.68 -1.66
United Kingdom  -0.88 -1.25 -1.57 -1.32
a. Source : Capros et al. (NTUA), Evaluation of Fiscal Measures for Energy Products in European Union - Results from the GEM-E3 and
MIDAS Models, Report to European Commission DG-XI under Contract b4-3040/95/449/MAR/B1, October 30 1996. 
1998 2000 2002 2005
Case 1C 
Germany -0.20 -0.64 -1.06 -1.00
Belgium -0.59 -1.22 -1.80 -1.74
France -0.09 -0.27 -0.51 -0.49
Italy -0.09 -0.30 -0.51 -0.46
Netherlands -0.02 -0.18 -0.57 -0.55
United Kingdom  -0.63 -1.31 -1.89 -1.77
Case 3C 
Germany -2.24 -3.73 -5.10 -4.76
Belgium -2.28 -3.14 -4.07 -3.82
France -2.71 -4.43 -5.95 -5.50
Italy -6.61 -9.43 -11.80 -10.68
Netherlands -3.11 -5.93 -8.70 -8.44
United Kingdom  -4.04 -5.44 -6.84 -6.58Working Paper 8-98
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FIGURE 1 - Scenario impacts on employers’ social security contributions rates in 
2005 (deviations in points of % w.r.t. the baseline scenario) 
B.Macroeconomic Coherence and Main Results 
1. The scenarios without recycling 
There exists a common logic underlying each of the three cases considered : The
energy price increases produce negative effects through a lowering of household
real disposable income. They are also responsible for initial substitution effects
in favour of labour in those sectors that are modelled by Putty-Clay production
functions where one finds complementarity between energy and capital. How-
ever, this substitution effect is not very pronounced or, in any case, not sufficient
to compensate for the negative effects of the higher energy taxes on disposable
income. In the medium term, the negative effects are reinforced by the lower
competitiveness resulting from the rise in production costs. 
The lower interest rates do not produce any important effects on aggregate capi-
tal formation, and so do not lead to an investment-lead rise in GDP. This result is
contrary to that obtained by the GEM-E3 model, which shows a a slight increase
in GDP by the year 2005, although the income from the increased taxation is not
the object of any explicit recycling. This highlights the classical properties of the
GEM model, in which interest rates are function of budget deficits, while invest-
ment and consumption respond markedly to interest rates. One must note how-
ever that this version of the GEM model does not work with a rational
expectations structure, thus excluding any possible relation between anticipated
reductions in budget deficits and increases in private consumption. On the other
hand, the HERMES models exhibit some Keynesian properties, by which the
absence of tax income recycling is at the origin of a fall in GDP for EUR-6 by the
year 2005. The obtained reduction in GDP are -0.23, -0.21 and -1.60 percent,












These general results are, however, the canvas for some important differences
between the three scenarios. First, an important difference can be noted regard-
ing the magnitude of the ex ante tax increase, much larger in Case 3 than of the
other two scenarios. This is the essential factor explaining the very similar effects
of scenarios 1 and 2 on EUR-6 GDP. In turn, the smaller tax increase in scenario 2
than in 1 explains the relatively better results of this scenario on GDP and its rela-
tively better industrial competitiveness. 
With regard to the employment effects, one may note that the substitution effects
are unable to generate sufficient employment and income to compensate for the
negative effects of the increased taxation. Employment in scenarios 1, 2 and 3
decreases by 0.14, 0.13 and 1.01 percent respectively. Concerning the public
finances of EUR-6, one notes that, notwithstanding the general decrease in eco-
nomic activity, the budget in the three scenarios benefits from the measures. 
In scenario 3, the increase in inflation is significant. Household real gross dispos-
able income falls throughout the simulation period due in particular to the pres-
ence of delays in wage indexation mechanisms as well as to increased
unemployment. 
Finally, the reduction in energy consumption for EUR-6 varies from -0.8 % in sce-
nario 1 to -7.1 % in scenario 3. The cost of the reduction in energy consumption is
thus very high when this cost is evaluated through the computation of multi-
plier defined as the ratio of the energy consumption reduction over the energy
tax increase. 
One must bear in mind that these general macroeconomic results at an European
level can hide important differences both at the national and sectoral levels. For
example, the ex ante tax increase in 2005 in scenario 3 represents 1.0 % of GDP for
Belgium but 3.1 % for Italy. A more detailed analysis on the national and sectoral
results can be found in a following chapter. 
2. The scenarios involving a recycling of the tax receipts through a reduction 
in indirect labour costs 
Here, the additional tax revenues are recycled through reductions in employers’
social security contributions, which limit the negative effect of the tax rise by re-
injecting income into the economy. This policy also enhances employment by
increasing the substitution effects, that arise between the production factors.
This explains why the macroeconomic results for EUR-6 reveal a positive impact
of the measures on GDP for each of the three scenarios 1C, 2C and 3C. 
The measures have the following implications : The higher substitution in
favour of labour increases employment. The rise in employment and the indexa-
tion of wages to inflation in the medium term gradually lead to real wage
increases, inducing a rise in private consumption and an increase in economic
activity. Working Paper 8-98
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However, one may note some differences across countries. In the case of Bel-
gium, where the evolution of wages is closely linked to labour productivity
(even if a Phillips curve is also present), real gross wages per capita fall below
their levels in the reference scenario. This comes from a relative decline in labour
productivity, following a rise in employment that is all the larger in the presence
of a reduction in employers’ social security contributions. Economic growth is
primarily lead by the rise in exports stemming from increased price-competitive-
ness. 
The general rise in real wages and hence private consumption, even in the face
of a decline in labour productivity, is similar to the results obtained by the NTUA
team with the GEM-E3 model. However, the rise in real wages and private con-
sumption obtained by the GEM model is not due to a Phillips curve (absent in the
model), but by rigidities in the labour supply curve. The results of both the
HERMES and GEM models show, however, that there exists the possibility of
achieving a double dividend in terms of employment and energy consumption,
even if there exist differences in the simulation results concerning these two var-
iables. 
Though a double dividend outcome can be found, the mechanisms behind the
rise in private consumption are also those that will tend to limit economic
growth in the longer run and, so doing, reverse the double dividend solution.
Indeed, in the long run, the real wage increases will impede competitiveness and
growth, which will then reduce the initial employment increase obtained with
the tax revenue recycling. Though this phenomenon is particular to macroecono-
metric models possessing Phillips curves, it has the merit of emphasizing that if
the implementation of an economic policy measure creates employment through
a fall in labour productivity, then it is important to limit real wage increases to
labour productivity growth if one wishes to avoid job destruction in the long
run. 
Taking these general considerations about scenarios 1C, 2C and 3C as a starting
point, we may now turn to a more in depth analysis of the scenario results at the
national and the sectoral levels. Working Paper 8-98
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C.Country Results 
1. The scenarios without any recycling of the proceeds from the tax 
In these scenarios, an assumption was made linking the reduction in public
budget deficits and debt to interest rates. All results will be given for the year
2005. 
a. Scenarios 1 and 2 
The differences between countries mainly reflect the ex ante differences in the
energy tax increases. Scenario 1 highlights countries such as Italy or the Nether-
lands, where the initial excise taxes on energy are relatively high and thus where
the tax increases are small. Indeed, we may note that the revenue from the tax
increases in scenario 1 are of 0.09 % of GDP for Italy and 0.15 % for the Nether-
lands, compared to 0.53 % for Belgium and 0.48 % for the United Kingdom. Gen-
eral comments below apply to both the scenarios 1 and 2. The numerical results
given below refer only to scenario 1. 
i. Belgium 
In the case of Belgium, the excise tax increases are at the origin of a 5.5 % rise in
general energy prices. Though the ex ante tax receipts are proportionally larger in
Belgium than in the other European countries considered, the ex post impact of
the measure on prices is lower than the European average. The moderate effect
on prices reflects two important features of the Belgian model. Firstly, the wage
setting mechanism links rises in nominal wages to rises in labour productivity.
Secondly, the automatic indexation of wages and social benefits is based on a
“health price index”, which is the general consumer price index from which the
prices of alcohol, tobacco products and energy are eliminated. This type of index-
ation insures that the excise tax rises are not automatically passed on into wages.
Thus, although GDP and employment fall by 0.12 % and 0.07 % respectively, their
reduction is smaller than the European average. 
International comparison of the impact of the tax increase can be made by calcu-
lating the “tax to GDP multiplier”, which measures the ratio of the percentage fall
in GDP in 2005 to the tax income in percentage of GDP in 2005. This gives a “tax-
GDP multiplier” with a rather low value of -0.23 for Belgium. This result stems
from the fact that although the additional excise taxes raise consumption prices
and reduce household real disposable income, the wage setting mechanism limits
the price-cost spiral and the fall in price-competitiveness. 
Note also that the reduction in domestic demand, and particularly domestic en-
ergy demand, has a significant negative effect on imports. The reduction in
energy imports produces a positive effect on the external balance and thus limits
the negative effect of the measure on GDP. The results also show that the reduc-
tion in interest rates that is introduced in the model is not sufficient to
compensate for the negative effects of the higher taxation. Aggregate capital for-
mation is increased relative to its level in the reference scenario, only due to theWorking Paper 8-98
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high interest sensitivity of household investment in dwellings. Finally, energy
consumption is reduced by 1.04 %, which is more than the average for EUR-6. 
ii.France 
Computing the ratio of the fall in GDP in 2005 to the income resulting from the tax
increase in 2005, we obtain a tax-GDP multiplier that is roughly equal to one (in
absolute terms). This can be considered as a typical value for this type of measure.
The fall in GDP comes as no surprise : The energy price rise induces a reduction in
real income that is not compensated by the rise in employment. This income ef-
fect reduces private consumption and, consequently, output. In turn, investment
suffers from the downturn in activity as well as from the rise in energy prices, due
to the complementarity between capital and energy in the Putty-Clay production
functions of the models. The fall in interest rates that is introduced in the scenario
is not sufficient to counter this effect. In the medium term, the decrease in GDP is
reinforced by a loss in price-competitiveness resulting from production cost in-
creases that are greater in France than in the other European countries. This
higher inflation is obtained notwithstanding the fact that the ex ante rise in excise
taxes is relatively limited. Employment falls by 0.05 % below its level in the refer-
ence scenario, although this fall is more limited than the decrease in GDP, due to
the factor substitutions following the rise in the relative price of energy. Finally,
energy consumption falls by 0.71 %, indicating a significant increase in energy
efficiency. 
iii.Germany 
The implementation of the excise tax rise in Germany, equivalent to 0.27 % of GDP
in 2005, reduces GDP by 0.24 % at the end of the simulation period. This effect on
activity is in line with the average European reduction in output. The mecha-
nisms leading to the reduction in growth are straightforward. The rise in excises
drive up consumption prices, so reducing household real disposable income. The
lags in the wage setting mechanism as well as the rise in unemployment keep that
nominal wage increases below inflation, leading to a regular decrease in real in-
come and private consumption. The reduction in real wages limits the rise in unit
labour costs and the subsequent loss of price-competitiveness. Though we may
note a rise in export prices, this rise does not produce marked effects on exports,
which fall only very moderately at the end of the simulation period. In 2005, em-
ployment is reduced by 0.14 %, which is in line with the EUR-6 average. The tax-
GDP multiplier is equal to -0.88, while final energy consumption falls by 0.83 % in
2005. 
iv.Italy 
In the case of Italy, the computed tax-GDP multiplier is equal to -1.1. The mecha-
nisms behind the results are similar to those described in the case of France, with
a fall in all the components of domestic demand. Note however that Italy increas-
es its competitiveness relative to the other European countries, due to the
relatively small increase in excise taxes. A decrease in labour productivity is also
noted in the case of Italy, although its reduction is less important than that of GDP.
Finally, scenario 1 produces a 0.45 % reduction in total energy consumption. Working Paper 8-98
17
v.The Netherlands 
The implementation of the scenario in the Netherlands imposes a rise in excise
taxes corresponding to an ex ante fiscal income of 0.15 % of GDP in 2005. This rise
in taxes is somewhat below the EUR-6 average, and the computation of the tax-
GDP multiplier gives a value of -0.60, which is somewhere between those of Bel-
gium and Germany. Here again, the logic behind the results is quite
straightforward. The measure produces a moderate 1.79 % increase in energy
prices in 2005. The only limited and delayed adjustment of nominal wages to con-
sumption prices allows the unit labour costs to remain more or less unchanged
over the whole simulation period, while some small employment increases are
obtained due to the factor substitutions brought about by the relative price in-
crease of energy inputs. By the year 2005, GDP falls by 0.09 %, while total energy
consumption decreases by 0.82 %. 
vi.The United Kingdom 
With regard to the magnitude of the ex ante fiscal measure, the tax increase imple-
mented in the United Kingdom is one of the most important, second only to the
one in Belgium. The fiscal revenue generated by the measure is equivalent to
0.48 % of GDP in 2005, compared to 0.53 % in Belgium and 0.09 % in Italy. The ef-
fect on the UK economy is significant, the tax-GDP multiplier being equal to -1.02.
The initial tax increase directly affects consumption prices and reduces house-
hold real disposable income. A strong wage-price spiral raises nominal wages to
compensate for the price rise, limiting the fall in real wages even in the face of de-
clining labour productivity and greater unemployment. In 2005, unit labour costs
rise by 0.91 %, while GDP and real wages fall by 0.49 % and 0.24 %, respectively.
This wage-price spiral reduces the country’s price-competitiveness and hence ex-
ports. In all, employment is reduced by 0.33 % in 2005, while total energy
consumption falls by 1.41 %. 
b. Scenario 3 
In this scenario, where the rise in excise taxes is more notable than in scenarios 1
and 2, we find that the results are more contrasted from one country to another.
In the present case, countries, where tax levels were initially higher than the
European average, see their tax rates rise proportionally to the rises in other
countries, resulting in much higher tax levels in absolute terms. This is particu-
larly the case for Italy and the Netherlands, where the resulting tax revenue in
2005 represents respectively 3.1 % and 2.4 % of GDP. The larger part of this reve-
nue comes from the rise in the energy prices for household energy consumption
and private transportation. 
i. Belgium 
The effect of this scenario in terms of ex ante tax revenue is important, since tax
income in 2005 is equal to 1.04 % of GDP compared to 0.53 % in scenario 1. The
magnitude of the measure is thus multiplied by two, but the increase relative to
scenario 1 is smaller for Belgium than for the other EUR-6 countries. Indeed,
whereas the measure in scenario 1 was more important for Belgium than for the
other countries, it is now the least important in scenario 3. The computed tax-GDP
multiplier is equal to -0.41 in this scenario, larger (in absolute terms) than in sce-Working Paper 8-98
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nario 1. This results essentially from the more inflationary import prices and the
larger fall in the GDPS and imports of Belgium’s main trading partners in this sce-
nario. The mechanisms behind the present results are identical to those described
for scenarios 1 and 2. The energy price rise reduces real income, and so private
consumption. Nominal wages don’t fully adjust to the price increase due to the
declining labour productivity and rising unemployment. This limits the rise in
unit labour costs and consequently the loss of price-competitiveness. In 2005, GDP
falls by 0.43 % and employment by 0.34 %. Finally, total energy consumption is
reduced by 2.5 %. 
ii.France 
In this scenario, the measure that is implemented reduces GDP by 1.3 % in 2005.
This is obtained with an additional tax income of 1.1 % of GDP, resulting in a tax-
GDP multiplier of -1.15. A reduction in private consumption, and more precisely
household energy consumption, leads to a decline in GDP. Once more, we note
that although the ex ante excise tax rise is relatively smaller in France that in the
other European countries considered, the effect on prices turns out to be larger,
leading to a reduced price-competitiveness. Also, the reduction in interest rates
is not sufficient to lead to a rise in investment. Employment is only reduced by
0.57 % due to the substitution effects brought about by the rise in the relative
price of energy. Total energy consumption falls by 4 % at the end of the simula-
tion period. 
iii.Germany 
Scenario 3 produces much more pronounced effects on the German economy
than scenario 1. In the present case, the tax-GDP multiplier is equal to -1.31, down
from -0.88 in scenario 1. The larger fall in GDP, i.e. 1.62 % in 2005, is partly ex-
plained by the larger rise in excise taxes, tax income representing 1.24 % of GDP
in 2005. Another and more essential explanation of the lower multiplier is the
stronger negative impact and the higher import prices in Germany’s trading part-
ner countries. Indeed, we note that, while scenario 1 hardly produced any
negative effects on German exports, scenario 3 reduces them by 0.82 %. Import
prices rise by 0.50 % in 2005, whereas we noted a 0.10 % rise in scenario 1. The
lags in the wage setting mechanisms, as well as the rise in unemployment, allow
for reductions in real wages throughout the simulation period, inducing further
reductions in real disposable income, and hence in domestic demand. In 2005,
employment is reduced by 0.98 %, while energy consumption falls by 6.13 %. 
iv.Italy 
The rise in excise taxes in this scenario is very important, generating tax income
equivalent to 3.1 % of GDP in 2005. With a 1.8 % decline in GDP in 2005, we com-
pute a tax-GDP multiplier of -0.58. This multiplier is low, indicating that country-
specific properties are important in this scenario. A detailed analysis of the re-
sults reveal that investment in fixed capital formation by firms and investment in
housing by households is relatively more sensitive to the reduction in interest
rates in Italy than in the other European countries : Total investment falls by only
0.35 % in 2005. Employment declines by 1.1 % in 2005, the substitution effects and
a rather long productivity cycle tend to limit job destruction. Finally, the impor-Working Paper 8-98
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tant increase in energy prices leads to a 15 % reduction in total energy
consumption. 
v.The Netherlands 
The measure implemented in scenario 3 for the Netherlands is quite important. It
implies an ex ante tax receipt that is equivalent to 2.39 % of GDP, second only to
the effect of the measure in Italy. The value of the tax-GDP multiplier is -0.53,
which cannot be considered as high (in absolute terms). Here, the limited and de-
layed adjustment of nominal wages to prices allows the unit labour costs to
remain more or less unchanged at the end of the simulation period, though em-
ployment falls due to the larger reduction in import demand in the other EUR-6
countries. Note that the drop in exports mainly affects the energy sector, EUR-6
energy consumption falling by 7.13 % in2005. By the end of the simulation period,
GDP falls by 1.27 %, while total Dutch energy consumption decreases by 3.57 %. 
vi.The United Kingdom 
Scenario 3 introduces a substantial increase in excise taxes in comparison with
scenario 1, the measure implemented resulting in ex ante tax revenue equal to
2.02 % of GDP and a 2.02 % reduction in GDP in 2005, giving a unit tax-GDP multi-
plier. The initial rise in energy prices tends to reduce real household disposable
income, driving up nominal wage demands. However, the wage setting process
does not allow for a full indexation of wages to prices, pushing real wages down.
In a context of declining labour productivity, the resulting drop in real wages is
insufficient to stop unit labour costs from rising by 3.33 % in 2005, this rise being
much larger than the EUR-6 average of 2.29 %. This significant rise in costs pushes
up export prices, limiting price-competitiveness and exports. In 2005, total ex-
ports drop by 1.02 % while exports of energy products fall by 3.2 %, due to a
reduction in EUR-6 imports and a reduction in general energy consumption. By
the end of the simulation period, employment is reduced by 1.64 %, while energy
consumption drops by 5.1 %. 
2. The scenarios with recycling of the tax proceeds 
In the following scenarios we explicitly assume that the additional tax revenue is
completely recycled into reductions in employers’ social security contributions,
so reducing indirect labour costs. Once more, we choose to focus on scenarios 1C
and 3C, due to the contrast in the magnitude of the measures that are imple-
mented. 
a. Scenario 1C 
The recycling of the tax revenue reduces indirect labour costs, inducing further
substitution effects. Although these substitution effects have a positive impact
on employment, their effect on GDP is relatively small. Working Paper 8-98
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i. Belgium 
In the case of Belgium, the recycling of the ex ante tax income, equivalent to 0.53 %
of GDP in 2005, allows a reduction of employers’ social security contributions (ES-
SC) rates of 1.74 percentage points. This fall in indirect labour costs allows
employers to offset the initial inflationary effect of the excise tax increase and so
to reduce unit labour costs, even in the face of declining labour productivity. The
energy tax increases, combined with the revenue recycling into lower ESSC rates,
modifies the relative prices of production factors in favour of labour. The lower
production costs bring about a rise in GDP, due to increased price-competitive-
ness and subsequent higher exports and reduced imports. Note that the rise in
GDP is fully export-lead, with a negative contribution of domestic demand to the
higher growth. This results from the fact that the tax increases drive up consump-
tion prices and reduce household real disposable income, even though the
increase in output raises employment by 0.41 % in 2005. Finally, the measure
leads to a 0.89 % drop in total energy consumption and produces a positive effect
on public finances. 
ii.France 
This scenario hardly produces any effect on GDP. Employment increases in 2005
by 0.09 % due to the substitution effects coming from the rise in energy prices, re-
inforced by a 0.49 percentage point reduction in ESSC rates due to the recycling of
the tax proceeds. The consumption price increases by 0.10 %, which is slightly
above the average for EUR-6. Energy consumption is reduced by 0.61 % at the end
of the simulation period. 
iii.Germany 
In Germany, the ex ante tax receipts represent the equivalent of 0.27 % of GDP in
2005. This revenue, when recycled into reductions in ESSC rates, allows for a 1 per-
centage point reduction of these rates at the end of the simulation period. As was
the case for Belgium, the recycling measure allows employers to offset the effect
of the energy price rise on gross nominal wages and to reduce real wage costs.
The reduction in the price of labour relative to the other production factors is at
the origin of higher employment, which rises by 0.26 % in 2005. This job creation
more than fully compensates for the lower real gross wages, producing a rise in
household real disposable income. Thus, in the case of Germany, the measure
raises GDP by 0.17 % in 2005 due to an increase in both domestic demand and ex-
ports. Finally, total energy consumption falls by 0.41 % in the year 2005. 
iv.Italy 
In the case of Italy, GDP rises by 0.12 %, which can be considered to be substantial
given the magnitude of the initial tax increase of 0.09 % of GDP in 2005. The rise
in economic activity is mainly due to private consumption, which increases by
0.17 % relative to its level in the reference scenario. Employment increases by
0.11 %, the substitution effects not having any significant impact. Working Paper 8-98
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v.The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the increased tax receipt resulting from the rise in excises rep-
resents 0.15 % of GDP, which is relatively smaller than the tax revenue in the other
EUR-6 countries. Not surprisingly, the implied reduction in ESSC rates is also the
smallest of all EUR-6 countries except Italy. The recycling measure does however
allow for a reduction in unit labour costs and a slight rise in employment. The
negative effect on household real disposable income of the excise tax increases is
more than offset by the higher employment, allowing domestic demand to rise
slightly in 2005. The reduction in energy imports by the other EUR-6 countries
produces a small decline in Dutch exports, but GDP manages to stabilize in 2005.
Also, the measure reduces final energy consumption in 2005 by 0.55 %. 
vi.The United Kingdom 
The ex ante tax receipts available to reduce ESSC rates are equal to 0.48 % for the
United Kingdom. This allows a 1.77 percentage point drop in ESSC rates in 2005,
which is the largest point reduction of all EUR-6 countries for scenario 1C. Simi-
larly to the Netherlands, the relatively important reduction in indirect wage costs
are at the origin of a significant fall in unit labour costs. This tends to mitigate the
effect of the energy price rise on the overall consumption price index, so preserv-
ing price-competitiveness. The reduction in the relative price of labour induces
production factor substitutions that lead to a 0.20 % rise in employment in 2005.
The higher employment, combined with gross real wage increases, raises house-
hold real disposable income and hence private consumption. By 2005, the
measure increases GDP by 0.10 % though final energy consumption falls by a sig-
nificant 1.14 %. 
b. The 3C scenario 
i. Belgium 
The strong positive effects of the scenario 3C on Belgian GDP is due to the magni-
tude of the ex ante tax proceeds, which represent 1.04 % of GDP in 2005, and the
3.82 percentage point reduction of ESSC rates that their recycling allows. The as-
sociated reduction in labour costs tends to reinforce the substitution effects
initiated by the rise in energy prices, leading to a 0.90 % increase in employment
by 2005. The measure produces a fall in total production costs, allowing for an in-
crease in price-competitiveness and a 0.13 % rise in exports at the end of the
period. However, the price rise is not completely compensated by the rise in em-
ployment, explaining the reduction in household real disposable income and
private consumption. Also, the measure has a positive effect on public budget
deficits and it is at the origin of a 1.92 % drop in final energy consumption. 
ii.France 
The recycling of the additional tax revenue allows for a 5.50 percentage point re-
duction in the ESSC rates, which in turn produces a 0.33 % rise in employment,
whereas GDP increases by 0.15 %. The comparison of these two figures highlights
the importance of the substitution effects. Working Paper 8-98
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iii.Germany 
In Germany, the tax revenue from the measure is recycled into a 4.76 percentage
point reduction of ESSC rates, allowing for a 1.05 % decline in unit labour costs by
2005. The reduction in the price of labour relative to other production factors in-
creases employment by 1 % at the end of the simulation period. The important job
creation, accompanied by gross real wage increases, tends to raise household dis-
posable income and private consumption. The increase in output and domestic
demand lead to price increases that are reinforced by rising wage pressures due
to the fall in unemployment. The competitive position of Germany suffers, be-
cause the fall in unit labour costs is smaller than the EUR-6 average, resulting in a
0.15 % fall in exports. Finally, total energy consumption declines by 4.04 % in
2005. 
iv.Italy 
In this scenario, the fiscal measure implemented in Italy is equivalent to a little
more than 3 % of GDP in 2005. The associated energy price rise for households is
31.86 %, leading to important substitution effects between energy and non energy
consumption categories. This results in an ex post energy consumption and tax re-
ceipts that are notably lower that what the ex ante computations would suggest.
This implies that the ex ante lowering of employers’ social security contributions
rates, computed in function of the ex ante tax revenue, turns out to be excessive.
Thus, in the case of Italy it was necessary to simulate an ex post equivalence be-
tween the increase in tax receipts and the reduction in social security rates. The
final ex post reduction in ESSC rates is 10.7 percentage points in 2005. The recycling
of the proceeds from the tax increase allows for a 2.53 % rise in GDP, whereas em-
ployment only rises by 1.25 % in 2005. 
v.The Netherlands 
In this scenario, the relatively high level of tax revenue from the rise in excises al-
lows for an important 8.44 percentage point reduction in ESSC rates in 2005. This
reduction in labour costs increases the substitution effects in favour of labour, re-
sulting in an increase in employment of 0.41 % in the year 2005. The rise in
employment, along with a rise in real gross wages, pushes up household real dis-
posable income and consumption without compromising the fall in unit labour
costs. Notwithstanding the substantial reduction in energy exports, total exports
rise by 0.16 % in 2005 due to increased price-competitiveness. Lastly, final energy
consumption is reduces by 2.14 % at the end of the period. 
vi.The United Kingdom 
The effects of scenario 3C for the United Kingdom are similar to those described
for the Netherlands. The recycling of the relatively large tax revenue allows a 6.58
percentage point reduction in ESSC rates. This significant reduction in wage cost
reduces unit labour costs, even though the fall in unemployment pushes real
gross wages up and reduces labour productivity. The subsequent rise in house-
hold real income increases private consumption by the end of the simulation
period, while the only very limited reduction in export prices reduces price-com-
petitiveness and exports. In 2005, the measure leads to a 0.12 % rise in GDP, a
0.39 % rise in employment, and a 4.09 reduction in final energy consumption. Working Paper 8-98
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TABLE 7 - Main macroeconomic results for 2005 (differences in %, w.r.t. the baseline)
12 3 1 C 2 C 3 C
Gross Domestic Product 
Germany -0.24 -0.23 -1.62 0.17 0.14 0.44
Belgium -0.12 -0.12 -0.43 0.12 0.11 0.23
France -0.18 -0.16 -1.27 0.03 0.01 0.15
Italy -0.10 -0.07 -1.81 0.12 0.10 2.53
Netherlands -0.09 -0.08 -1.27 0.01 0.01 0.33
United Kingdom -0.49 -0.45 -2.02 0.10 0.09 0.12
Europe -6 countries -0.23 -0.21 -1.60 0.10 0.08 0.74
Consumer prices 
Germany 0.42 0.41 2.79 0.03 0.05 0.67
Belgium 0.37 0.35 1.14 0.20 0.20 0.27
France 0.56 0.52 4.16 0.10 0.10 1.06
Italy 0.03 0.00 5.15 -0.35 -0.32 -3.29
Netherlands 0.18 0.17 3.04 0.12 0.12 1.63
United Kingdom 1.01 0.98 3.93 0.38 0.36 2.16
Europe -6 countries 0.47 0.44 3.79 0.04 0.05 0.23
Real gross wages per head (firms) 
Germany -0.16 -0.16 -1.21 0.29 0.25 1.32
Belgium -0.29 -0.29 -0.74 -0.43 -0.42 -1.02
France -0.06 -0.06 -0.89 0.12 0.10 0.56
Italy -0.15 -0.11 -4.22 -0.05 -0.03 -0.83
Netherlands -0.11 -0.11 -2.02 0.23 0.23 0.44
United Kingdom -0.24 -0.21 -1.16 0.46 0.39 2.17
Europe -6 countries -0.16 -0.15 -1.77 0.20 0.17 0.80
Employment 
Germany -0.14 -0.14 -0.98 0.26 0.22 1.00
Belgium -0.07 -0.07 -0.34 0.41 0.38 0.90
France -0.05 -0.05 -0.57 0.09 0.07 0.33
Italy -0.06 -0.04 -1.10 0.11 0.09 1.25
Netherlands 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.08 0.41
United Kingdom -0.33 -0.31 -1.64 0.20 0.18 0.39
Europe -6 countries -0.14 -0.13 -1.01 0.18 0.15 0.74
Net lending or net borrowing of public administrations (in % of GDP) 
Germany 0.26 0.23 1.12 0.11 0.09 0.47
Belgium 0.61 0.58 1.74 0.08 0.07 0.12
France 0.23 0.21 1.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.22
Italy 0.05 0.05 1.39 -0.06 -0.05 -0.66
Netherlands 0.08 0.08 2.04 0.13 0.13 1.63
United Kingdom 0.50 0.47 2.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.22
Europe -6 countries 0.27 0.25 1.38 0.02 0.02 0.02Working Paper 8-98
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TABLE 8 - Summary of results for 2005
FIGURE 2 - Net new job creations in 2005 
(deviations in thousands, w.r.t. the baseline) 
 
12 3 1 C 2 C 3 C
Employment (differences in thousands w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -40 -41 -286 75 64 291
Belgium -3 -3 -13 15 14 34
France -11 -11 -132 20 17 77
Italy -12 -9 -245 26 21 280
Netherlands 0 0 -3 4 4 22
United Kingdom -87 -84 -436 53 49 104
Europe -6 countries -153 -147 -1 115 194 169 808
Final energy consumption (differences in % w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -0.83 -0.80 -6.13 -0.41 -0.49 -4.04
Belgium -1.04 -1.02 -2.50 -0.89 -0.88 -1.92
France -0.71 -0.63 -4.00 -0.61 -0.50 -3.19
Italy -0.45 -0.30 -15.00 -0.21 -0.11 -12.31
Netherlands -0.82 -0.80 -3.57 -0.69 -0.67 -2.14
United Kingdom -1.41 -1.29 -5.10 -1.14 -1.03 -4.09
Europe -6 countries -0.84 -0.76 -7.13 -0.59 -0.54 -5.50
Total CO2 emissions (differences in % w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -2.99 n.a. -8.29 -1.43 -1.66 -5.62
Belgium -2.25 -2.30 -3.55 -1.82 -1.68 -3.02
France -3.06 n.a. -6.72 -2.93 -2.28 -5.73
Italy -3.39 n.a. -18.25 -1.38 -0.73 -12.53
Netherlands -1.40 n.a. -4.65 -1.18 -1.08 -2.75
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FIGURE 3 - Scenario impacts on European GDP 
(deviations in %, w.r.t. the baseline scenario) 
 
FIGURE 4 - Scenario impacts on European consumption 





























FIGURE 5 - Scenario impacts on European final energy consumption in 2005 
(deviations in %, w.r.t. the baseline scenario) 
 
FIGURE 6 - Scenario impacts on real per capita wage costs in 2005 




























IV The February 1997 Proposal for the 
Taxation of Energy Products 
This fourth chapter presents the results of simulations carried out with the
HERMES - Link system of models following alternative assumptions regarding
minimum excise tax rates as presented in the February 1997 proposal of the Com-
mission services. 
We recall that in Case 1, as defined in section II, point C, all EU Member-States in-
troduce rates defined as the maximum between either their effective energy tax
rates or the minimum values proposed by the EC. Current tax rates of EU-coun-
tries are assumed to be updated with inflation and then compared to the new
minimum levels of taxation rates. This implementation rule implies that the shift
in the tax burden will differ between countries, as the additional taxation will de-
pend on the preexisting levels of excise taxes. 
TABLE 9 - Revised February 1997 Proposal for Minimum Excise Taxes (ECUS per specific unit) 
Unit 1998 2000 2002
Motor Fuels 
Gasoline klt 417 450 500
Gasoil klt 310 343 393
Kerosene klt 310 343 393
LPG tn 141 174 224
Natural Gas Gj 2.9 3.5 4.5
Fuels used as provided in Article 7, paragraph 2 
Gasoline klt 32 37 41
Kerosene klt 30 35 39
LPG tn 41 48 53
Natural Gas Gj 0.3 0.6 1.1
Fuels 
Heating gas oil klt 21 23 26
Heavy fuel oil tn 18 23 28
Kerosene klt 7 16 25
LPG tn 10 22 34
Natural Gas G j 0 . 20 . 4 50 . 7
Solid fuels G j 0 . 20 . 4 50 . 7
Electricity  MWh 1 2 3Working Paper 8-98
28
The changes introduced in this revised proposal, as compared to Case 1, can be
summarized as follows : 
Excise tax rates on motor fuels have been lowered ; 
Exemptions of energy intensive industries have been implemented as pro-
vided in article 15, paragraph 2 of the revised Proposal. 
TABLE 10 - Main macroeconomic results for 2005 (differences in %, w.r.t. the baseline)
1 2 3 1C 2C 3C 4C
Gross Domestic Product 
Germany -0.24 -0.23 -1.62 0.17 0.14 0.44 0.09
Belgium -0.12 -0.12 -0.43 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.09
France -0.18 -0.16 -1.27 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.01
Italy -0.10 -0.07 -1.81 0.12 0.10 2.53 0.10
Netherlands -0.09 -0.08 -1.27 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.00
United Kingdom -0.49 -0.45 -2.02 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.06
Europe -6 countries -0.23 -0.21 -1.60 0.10 0.08 0.74 0.06
Consumer prices 
Germany 0.42 0.41 2.79 0.03 0.05 0.67 0.07
Belgium 0.37 0.35 1.14 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.14
France 0.56 0.52 4.16 0.10 0.10 1.06 0.09
Italy 0.03 0.00 5.15 -0.35 -0.32 -3.29 -0.30
Netherlands 0.18 0.17 3.04 0.12 0.12 1.63 0.11
United Kingdom 1.01 0.98 3.93 0.38 0.36 2.16 0.27
Europe -6 countries 0.47 0.44 3.79 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.04
Real gross wages per head (firms) 
Germany -0.16 -0.16 -1.21 0.29 0.25 1.32 0.17
Belgium -0.29 -0.29 -0.74 -0.43 -0.42 -1.02 -0.30
France -0.06 -0.06 -0.89 0.12 0.10 0.56 0.10
Italy -0.15 -0.11 -4.22 -0.05 -0.03 -0.83 -0.04
Netherlands -0.11 -0.11 -2.02 0.23 0.23 0.44 0.17
United Kingdom -0.24 -0.21 -1.16 0.46 0.39 2.17 0.26
Europe -6 countries -0.16 -0.15 -1.77 0.20 0.17 0.80 0.12
Employment 
Germany -0.14 -0.14 -0.98 0.26 0.22 1.00 0.17
Belgium -0.07 -0.07 -0.34 0.41 0.38 0.90 0.30
France -0.05 -0.05 -0.57 0.09 0.07 0.33 0.07
Italy -0.06 -0.04 -1.10 0.11 0.09 1.25 0.10
Netherlands 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.08 0.41 0.08
United Kingdom -0.33 -0.31 -1.64 0.20 0.18 0.39 0.19
Europe -6 countries -0.14 -0.13 -1.01 0.18 0.15 0.74 0.14
Net lending or net borrowing of public administrations (in % of GDP) 
Germany 0.26 0.23 1.12 0.11 0.09 0.47 0.07
Belgium 0.61 0.58 1.74 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.07
France 0.23 0.21 1.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.22 0.00
Italy 0.05 0.05 1.39 -0.06 -0.05 -0.66 -0.05
Netherlands 0.08 0.08 2.04 0.13 0.13 1.63 0.07
United Kingdom 0.50 0.47 2.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.22 -0.01
Europe -6 countries 0.27 0.25 1.38 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02Working Paper 8-98
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Tables 10 through 16 present the main macroeconomic results of the new scenar-
io, called Case 4C, which adopts the Commission’s Revised February 1997
Proposal along with a recycling of the increased tax revenue into reductions in
employers’ social security contributions. These results are put into perspective,
being presented along those of cases 1 to 3, both with and without the labour fis-
cal reform option. 
As can be seen, the simulation of Case 4C confirms the conclusions reached in the
previous report concerning scenarios 1C and 2C. The results are very similar to
those of Case 2C, the main difference residing in the somewhat lower growth and
employment levels due to the recycling of a smaller tax revenue than in Case 2C.
Finally, we once again obtain a double dividend solution in terms of employment
and CO2 emissions, thus confirming the possibility of this type of outcome. 
TABLE 11 - Summary of results for 2005
12 3 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C
Employment (differences in thousands w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -40 -41 -286 75 64 291 50
Belgium -3 -3 -13 15 14 34 11
France -11 -11 -132 20 17 77 17
Italy -12 -9 -245 26 21 280 21
Netherlands 0 0 -3 4 4 22 4
United Kingdom -87 -84 -436 53 49 104 49
Europe -6 countries -153 -147 -1 115 194 169 808 152
Final energy consumption (differences in % w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -0.83 -0.80 -6.13 -0.41 -0.49 -4.04 -0.48
Belgium -1.04 -1.02 -2.50 -0.89 -0.88 -1.92 -0.79
France -0.71 -0.63 -4.00 -0.61 -0.50 -3.19 -0.47
Italy -0.45 -0.30 -15.00 -0.21 -0.11 -12.31 -0.20
Netherlands -0.82 -0.80 -3.57 -0.69 -0.67 -2.14 -0.50
United Kingdom  -1.41 -1.29 -5.10 -1.14 -1.03 -4.09 -0.95
Europe -6 countries  -0.84 -0.76 -7.13 -0.59 -0.54 -5.50 -0.52
Total CO2 emissions (differences in %w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -2.99 n.a. -8.29 -1.43 -1.66 -5.62 -1.63
Belgium -2.25 -2.30 -3.55 -1.82 -1.68 -3.02 -1.51
France -3.06 n.a. -6.72 -2.93 -2.28 -5.73 -2.14
Italy -3.39 n.a. -18.25 -1.38 -0.73 -12.53 -1.33
Netherlands -1.40 n.a. -4.65 -1.18 -1.08 -2.75 -0.81
United Kingdom -3.37 n.a. -7.83 -2.69 -2.34 -5.54 -2.16Working Paper 8-98
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In Case 4C, we note a positive effect on total market sector value added in all
countries considered. Sectoral activity is increased with respect to the baseline
scenario in all but the energy sector and, in the case of France and the United
Kingdom, the construction and equipment goods sectors. When comparing these
results to those obtained in Case 2C, we note that the results are very similar. Sec-
toral value added is generally only marginally worse off than in Case 2C, and the
only more or less significant differences are to be found in Germany. 
TABLE 12 - Impact of scenario 4C on sectoral value added and employment in 2005
(deviation in %, w.r.t. baseline scenario)




Energy -0.56 -0.16 -1.52 -0.28 -0.45 -0.75
Intermediate goods  0.06 0.07 0.48 0.02 0.08 0.32
Equipment goods  0.09 -0.04 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.12
Consumption goods  0.14 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.40
Construction 0.26 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.14 -0.02
Transportation & Communication  0.10 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.57
Other market services  0.17 0.04 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.05
Total of market sectors  0.11 0.01 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.10
Employment 
Energy -0.20 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.19 -0.21
Intermediate goods  0.55 0.28 -0.52 -0.10 0.13 0.41
Equipment goods  0.18 0.15 0.47 0.23 0.07 0.56
Consumption goods  0.43 0.37 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.44
Construction 0.70 0.08 0.19 0.07 0.18 0.11
Transportation & Communication  0.51 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.11 0.61
Other market services  0.31 0.04 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.13
Total of market sectors  0.36 0.09 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.24Working Paper 8-98
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TABLE 13 - Main macroeconomic results for 2000 (differences in %, w.r.t. the baseline)
1 2 3 1C 2C 3C 4C
Gross Domestic Product 
Germany -0.09 -0.09 -0.87 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.02
Belgium -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.04
France -0.05 -0.04 -0.60 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.01
Italy -0.07 -0.05 -2.93 0.05 0.04 0.85 0.04
Netherlands -0.02 -0.02 -0.65 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.01
United Kingdom -0.29 -0.29 -1.62 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.03
Europe -6 countries -0.11 -0.10 -1.35 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.02
Consumer prices 
Germany 0.18 0.17 1.75 0.06 0.07 0.82 0.00
Belgium 0.24 0.23 0.86 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.08
France 0.18 0.17 2.58 0.03 0.03 0.86 0.01
Italy -0.02 -0.01 3.63 -0.12 -0.10 0.19 -0.10
Netherlands 0.05 0.05 2.21 0.02 0.02 1.22 0.00
United Kingdom 0.56 0.58 3.03 0.08 0.11 0.85 0.05
Europe -6 countries 0.21 0.21 2.60 0.02 0.03 0.69 -0.01
Real gross wages per head (firms) 
Germany -0.09 -0.08 -0.50 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.02
Belgium -0.13 -0.14 -0.53 -0.20 -0.19 -0.73 -0.10
France -0.04 -0.04 -0.44 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01
Italy -0.02 -0.02 -2.49 0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.02
Netherlands -0.04 -0.03 -1.45 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.02
United Kingdom -0.21 -0.23 -1.07 0.05 0.02 0.38 0.04
Europe -6 countries -0.09 -0.10 -1.08 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.02
Employment 
Germany -0.04 -0.04 -0.43 0.08 0.07 0.44 0.04
Belgium -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.44 0.08
France -0.01 -0.01 -0.26 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.02
Italy -0.02 -0.02 -1.22 0.04 0.03 0.21 0.03
Netherlands 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.03
United Kingdom -0.12 -0.12 -1.00 0.12 0.11 0.28 0.11
Europe -6 countries -0.05 -0.05 -0.66 0.07 0.06 0.28 0.05
Net lending or net borrowing of public administrations (in % of GDP) 
Germany 0.18 0.16 1.13 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.00
Belgium 0.31 0.30 0.90 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.02
France 0.11 0.10 0.85 -0.03 -0.03 -0.30 -0.02
Italy 0.04 0.03 0.52 -0.02 -0.02 -0.39 -0.02
Netherlands 0.04 0.04 1.31 0.03 0.03 0.88 -0.01
United Kingdom 0.32 0.33 1.31 -0.02 0.02 0.18 0.00
Europe -6 countries 0.16 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01Working Paper 8-98
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TABLE 14 - Summary of results for 2000
TABLE 15 - Impact of scenario 4C on sectoral value added and employment in 2000
(deviation in %, w.r.t. baseline scenario)
1 2 3 1 C2 C3 C4 C
Employment (differences in thousands w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -12 -12 -122 23 19 126 10
Belgium -0 -0 0 7 6 16 3
France -3 -3 -59 5 4 28 4
Italy -5 -4 -264 9 7 46 7
Netherlands 0 0 -1 2 2 12 2
United Kingdom -30 -32 -261 32 28 72 29
Europe -6 countries -51 -50 -707 77 66 300 55
Final energy consumption (differences in % w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -0.30 -0.28 -2.99 -0.21 -0.20 -2.30 -0.05
Belgium -0.45 -0.45 -1.16 -0.46 -0.46 -1.25 -0.37
France -0.19 -0.18 -1.90 -0.16 -0.15 -1.56 -0.12
Italy -0.12 -0.09 -13.32 0.03 0.03 -9.60 0.02
Netherlands -0.18 -0.17 -1.80 -0.14 -0.14 -1.07 -0.13
United Kingdom  -0.61 -0.59 -2.94 -0.50 -0.48 -2.38 -0.36
Europe -6 countries  -0.30 -0.28 -4.88 -0.21 -0.20 -3.65 -0.13
Total CO2 emissions (differences in %w.r.t. the baseline) 
Germany -1.08 n.a. -4.04 -0.73 -0.68 -3.20 -0.17
Belgium -0.97 -1.01 -1.65 -0.94 -0.88 -1.97 -0.71
France -0.82 n.a. -3.19 -0.77 -0.68 -2.80 -1.01
Italy -0.09 n.a. -16.21 -0.20 -0.20 -9.77 -0.27
Netherlands -0.31 n.a. -2.34 -0.24 -0.23 -1.38 -0.41
United Kingdom -1.46 n.a. -4.51 -1.18 -1.09 -3.20 -2.05




Energy -0.17 -0.02 -0.24 0.00 -0.06 -0.40
Intermediate goods  0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.24 0.05 0.06
Equipment goods  0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.14
Consumption goods  0.04 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.23
Construction 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.01
Transportation & Communication  0.03 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.33
Other market services  0.08 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.09
Total of market sectors  0.05 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.09
Employment 
Energy -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.17
Intermediate goods  0.09 0.04 -0.29 -0.06 0.03 -0.04
Equipment goods  0.04 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.34
Consumption goods  0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.16
Construction 0.25 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.09
Transportation & Communication  0.15 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.29
Other market services  0.10 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.12
Total of market sectors  0.10 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.15Working Paper 8-98
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TABLE 16 - Impact of scenario 4C on sectoral value added and employment for EUR-6 
(deviation in %, w.r.t. baseline scenario)
2000 2005
Value Added (factor costs) 
Energy  -0.14 -0.52
Intermediate goods  0.00 0.22
Equipment goods  0.04 0.06
Consumption goods  0.07 0.17
Construction  0.02 0.04
Transportation & Communication  0.10 0.13
Other market services  0.05 0.11
Total of market sectors  0.04 0.10
Employment (in %) 
Energy  -0.06 -0.11
Intermediate goods  -0.11 -0.03
Equipment goods  0.12 0.39
Consumption goods  0.05 0.25
Construction  0.07 0.14
Transportation & Communication  0.11 0.22
Other market services  0.07 0.13
Total of market sectors  0.07 0.18
Employment (in thousands) 
Energy  -0.89 -1.44
Intermediate goods  -3.73 -0.92
Equipment goods  13.55 42.83
Consumption goods  5.29 24.58
Construction  5.04 11.04
Transportation & Communication  7.36 14.87
Other market services  26.50 55.05




Generally, the simulation results show that when recycling of the tax proceeds of
the rise in energy tax rates into reductions in employers’ social security contribu-
tions is allowed for, the different scenarios lead to slightly higher GDPS while
producing only limited inflationary increases. These scenarios also tend to lead to
higher employment, while simultaneously reducing CO2 emissions (we thus ob-
tain the so called “Double Dividend” solution 1). 
The measures were simulated in linked mode, allowing to take into account the
simultaneous implementation of fiscal measures in the different European coun-
tries considered. 
The more realistic cases (the first group of measures, as well as the Commission’s
February 1997 proposal), when tested with accompanying fiscal reform measures
in favour of employment, lead to positive effects on GDP, while increasing infla-
tion only slightly. They also have positive effects on employment and allow for
reductions in CO2 emissions. Finally, notwithstanding the ex ante fiscal neutrality
of the measures, these scenarios lead to slightly positive effects on public
finances. 
Without the accompanying recycling measures in favour of employment, the sce-
narios generally lead to lower GDPS and a decline in employment. However, a
more positive effect is found on public finances. 
The technical scenario (the second group of measures), imposing relatively high-
er tax increases than the former cases, produces less favourable results in terms
of employment and growth, though it leads to relatively greater reductions in CO2
emissions. 
Finally, the robustness of the results presented above has been tested and corrob-
orated by similar simulation experiments, carried out by other research teams in
the framework of the European Commission contract, using both macro-econo-
metric (HERMES and E3ME) and general equilibrium (GEM-E3) models. In
particular, the three models allow the testing of the existence of the “Double Div-
idends” solution, and confirm its possibility when the tax proceeds are recycling
into reductions in employers’ social contributions. 
1. This result was already found in an earlier study, conducted with HERMES-Link for the European 
Commission. See F. Bossier, I. Bracke, Th. Bréchet, L. Lemiale, C. Streel, P. Van Brusselen, 
P. Zagamé : Un redéploiement fiscal au service de l’emploi : réduction du coût salarial financé par la 
Taxe CO2/énergie, Planning Paper n° 65, Federal Planning Office, November 1993. Working Paper 8-98
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